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I.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred in Failing to Consider Awarding PMC Attorney's
Fees and Costs for Prevailing in the Contract Claim on Summary Judgment.
Mark Van ("Van") does not dispute that under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) an

award of fees to the prevailing party in a contract action is mandatory. Instead, Van argues that
although this Court remanded the case for trial on the whistleblower claim and expressly allowed
it to consider attorney fees "related to the appeal" based on the outcome of the trial, the district
court lacked junsdiction to award fees to PMC for prevailing on summary judgment. These
arguments are unsupported by the relevant case law, and must fail.
1.

Attorney's fees and costs were a subsidiary issue within the court's
jurisdiction on remand and the trial court erred in failing to consider
awarding fees for prevailing on the contract claims.

Nothing in this Court's remand order reversing summary judgment and vacating
the attorney's fee award prevented the trial court from awarding attorney's fees after PMC then
prevailed, at trial, on all claims. Van argues that because the award of attorney's fees on appeal
was vacated, it could not be reinstated. Respondent's Br. at 36. PMC does not dispute that the
award of fees was vacated, but PMC's entitlement to an award of fees did not vanish. Judgments
or orders are frequently entered on remand after the same decision was previously vacated. In
this very case, the district court entered judgment for PMC on the whistleblower claim in 2007,
and again in 2011 after the first judgment was vacated. See Supplemental Record ("Supp. R.") at
682-83 and R. VoL II at 343-44. Van cannot, and does not, argue that the district court did not
have authority to enter judgment for PMC simply because the earlier judgment was vacated.
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This Court has previously addressed this issue and upheld the reinstatement of
vacated fee awards. In Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 545, 82 P.3d 450,457 (2003), the
Court reversed a grant of summary judgment for Rockefeller and vacated the fee award. On
remand, the trial court again found in favor of Rockefeller and "reinstated its prior award of
attorney fees." Id. Grabow appealed, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the award. Id. CitingJ.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'!, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 258, 939 P.2d
574,577 (1997), this Court upheld the award as the attorney fees were a subsidiary issue to the
issues to be decided on remand. Id.
Perhaps seeking to avoid this clear precedent, Van construes PMC's argument to
be that either this Court's remand order stayed the fee award, or as arguing that the trial court
was required to automatically reinstate the award when PMC prevailed at trial. This is not
PMC's position. PMC argues that the district court erred in failing to even consider PMC's
entitlement to the earlier award of fees and costs for prevailing at summary judgment, on the
contract claims and the action as a whole. Notably, the trial court did not rule that Judge
McDermott's award was unreasonable or inconsistent with the law. See R. Vol. III at 567-68.
Instead, the court erred in narrowly construing this Court's decision in the prior appeal as
depriving it of jurisdiction to reinstate the award of fees on summary judgment. Id. The trial
court's interpretation is erroneous; this Court's decision neither barred PMC from receiving the
mandatory fees nor precluded the district court from considering them.
Van's argument that the trial court reached its decision not to award fees by an
exercise of discretion misreads the record. Cross-Respondent's Br. at 40. The court did not use
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its discretion in deciding not to award fees on the contract claim; instead it clearly stated that it
did not believe it had any discretion:
This Court's authority does not extend to those fees already
vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court. As such, this Court hereby
finds the Defendant, as the prevailing party on remand, is entitled
to an award of fees and costs incurred in pursuit ofthe appeal to
the Idaho Supreme Court in the amount of$38,192.82. However,
the Defendant is not entitled to reimbursement for the costs and
fees associated with defending against the Plaintiff s breach of
contract claims.
R. Vol. III at 568 (emphasis added). The court did not perceive the award of attorney's fees as
an issue of discretion, nor did it reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See Lee v.
Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 9, 189 P.3d 467,471 (2008). Therefore, its decision cannot stand. It
was not reasonable for the trial court to read this Court's decision narrowly so as to preclude an
award of attorney's fees and costs that are mandatory under controlling law. The error was even
less reasonable given clear precedent holding that attorney's fees may be considered on remand
except in limited cases where the remand is purely ministerial. See Rockefeller, 139 Idaho at
545,82 P.3d at 457, and cases cited infra. The abuse of discretion is exacerbated by the trial
court's determination that PMC was the prevailing party on all claims, including the contract
claims, and its recognition that except for the ambiguous language in the decision, PMC would
be entitled to a mandatory award of costs and fees. R. Vol. III at 557,567-68.
Attorney's fees were a subsidiary issue within the general remand of the
whistleblower claim. This Court has held that when a remand is merely ministerial, the trial
court may not consider additional issues, but where the remand is not ministerial, subsidiary

3

Client:2923532.2

issues not passed on by the Court may be considered. Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830,833,
979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999). For example, in Hummer the remand was considered ministerial
because the trial court's authority was limited to entering the amended judgment ordered by the
Court. !d. Accordingly, the trial court had no authority to award or consider attorney's fees. !d.
In Chemetics, however, the remand was narrow but not ministerial. Chemetics, 130 Idaho at

257-58,939 P.2d at 576-77. In that case, the Court ordered the trial court to reconsider the
award of fees to Simplot and reconsider the prevailing party analysis, but did not address an
award of fees to Chemetics. Id. at 257. The trial court refused to award fees to Chemetics, the
new prevailing party, because the Court's remand did not address such fees. Id. This was error.
Id. at 258. Because the claims involved a commercial transaction, "the prevailing party [was]

entitled to attorney's fees ... unless the remand from this Court limited the district court from
considering the question of the award of costs and fees to Chemetics." Id. at 257. It did not. Id.
Although not specifically addressing whether Chemetics was entitled to fees, the Court's
decision "in and of itself changed the prevailing party and thus granted the district judge
jurisdiction to address any issue, like attorney fees, that was related to the result in the appeal."
Hummer, 132 Idaho at 833, 979 P.2d at 119l.

Here, this Court's decision was similar to Chemetics. Although the opinion did
not itself change the prevailing party, the trial on remand might have changed the prevailing
party. Thus, as the Hummer court pointed out, the district court had jurisdiction to consider "any
issue, including attorney's fees, that was related to the result in the appeal." As in Chemetics, the
whistleblower trial on remand may have changed the prevailing party in the overall case,

4
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likewise allowing the court to consider attorney's fees which are related to the result of the
appeal. As Van admits, the Supreme Court did not pass on any aspect of the fee award,
including its amount or reasonableness. Cross-Respondent's Br. at 35. Accordingly,
reconsidering or reinstating the award would not contravene any decision of the Court.
2.

This Court's failure to pass on the reasonableness of Judge
McDermott's fee award does not preclude reinstating the award or
otherwise awarding fees.

As discussed above, the Court's failure to rule on the issue of attorney's fees is a
prerequisite to the trial court having jurisdiction on remand. Accordingly, that prerequisite
cannot bar the trial court's jurisdiction over the attorney's fees following the jury's verdict for
PMC. In this case, Judge McDennott examined the requested fees and costs, applied the
applicable law, and detennined the fees and costs that should be awarded to the prevailing party
under Section 12-120(3) and Rule 54(d)(IV R. Vol. I at 1-3. As such, he applied the same
process and the same law that Judge Naftz should have applied (and the same law Judge Naftz
did apply in awarding fees and costs on appeal and on the whistleblower claim, R. Vol. III
558-68). Because the fees were for prevailing on summary judgment, none ofthe facts bearing
on the reasonableness of the award would have changed since Judge McDennott considered
them. Whether the trial court reinstated the original award or chose to make its own evaluation
and award, the inescapable fact is that PMC was entitled to mandatory fees for prevailing on the

I Although Van argues that Judge McDennott included fees and costs for defending the
whistleblower claims, he cites nothing in the record to support his claim. Cross-Respondent's
Br. at 39. Therefore, the argument cannot be considered. LA.R. 35(a)(6); Jorgensen v.
Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524,528, 181 P.3d 450,454 (2008).
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contract claim. Any award of fees for the contract claims, whether determined by Judge
McDermott or Judge Naftz, would stand on equal footing in this appeal with the award of fees
for the prior appeal that is currently before the court.

3.

Having chosen to assert contract-based claims, Van cannot now avoid
the attorney's fees award that accompanies that choice.

In his complaint, Van brought claims for wrongful termination in violation of
Section 6-2101 et seq. SUpp. R. 650, Complaint at ~XXVI. The wrongful termination claim was
subsequently considered the whistleblower claim. Supp. R. 664, 673-76. In addition to the
whistleblower claim, Van also brought a claim for breach of contract, alleging two distinct
claims: breach of contract for termination in violation ofPMC's policies and procedures, and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Supp. R. 650, Complaint a~XXVIII. It is
well-established in Idaho law that contract claims, including employment contract claims, are
subject to Section 12-120(3)'s attorney's fees provisions. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141
Idaho 233, 244, 108 P.3d 380,391 (2005). Had Van prevailed on the contract claims,
undoubtedly he would have submitted a fee petition and offered no objection to the receipt of an
award of attorney's fees in accordance with the statute. However, having lost on all claims, Van
now argues that the gravamen of the claims was really statutory, not contractual. CrossRespondent's Bf. at 38. This ignores the clear language of the claim:
[T]hat he was employed subject to a contract of employment with
Defendant. . .. That he was entitled to the terms, conditions and
protection of his employment contract with Defendant and that as
the conduct of Defendants ... the policies and procedures of
Defendant were violated with regards to Plaintiff s employment,
and that Defendant [PMC] breached its policies and procedures in
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tenninating Plaintiff from his employment and further breached
the implied contract ofgood faith and fair dealing in its decision to
tenninate Plaintiffs employment.
Supp. R. 650, Complaint at ~III (emphasis added). The most cursory read of the foregoing
establishes that Van's allegations do not rely on any statute, but rather on the contract of
employment. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that PMC violated its own employment policies, not
a statute or even public policy. Id. The gravamen ofthe contract claim is indeed a contract.
Accordingly, attorney's fees must be awarded to PMC as the prevailing party under Section

12-120(3). Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 263, 999 P.2d 914,918 (Ct. App.
2000).

B.

PMC Is Entitled to Attorney's Fees on the Cross-Appeal Related to the
Contract Claims.
PMC's cross-appeal is a continuation of the contract claims, namely, that as the

prevailing party on summary judgment and in the case overall, PMC is entitled to an award of
attorney's fees under Section 12-120(3). PMC undertook this cross-appeal to obtain the
remedies to which it is entitled as the prevailing party on a contract claim. As discussed above,
the prevailing party in a contract claim is entitled to costs and fees on appeal, as well as at the
trial court level. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3); Daisy Mfg., 134 Idaho at 263,999 P.2d at 918.
Because PMC's claim for attorney's fees on the cross-appeal is directly related to the contract
claim, an award of reasonable fees is required.
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C.

Costs and Fees Should Be Awarded to PMC as the Prevailing Party in This
Appeal Because Van's Appeal Seeks only to Second-Guess the Jury's Verdict
and His Appeal of the Attorney's Fees Is Frivolous.
In addition to its entitlement to fees for the cross-appeal under 12-120(3), PMC is

entitled to attorney's fees related to this appeal under either Idaho Code Section 12-121 or
Section 6-2107. Under either standard, PMC is entitled to fees if the appeal is without basis in
law or fact. See IDAHO CODE §§ 12-121,6-2107; Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn

Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 218-19, 177 P.3d 955,965-66 (2008) (holding Section 12-121
"permits the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party if the court determines the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.").
Van's appeal of the special verdict relies solely on an effort to second-guess the
jury, which heard five weeks of evidence before reaching its verdict. Although cloaked in the
guise of an assertion that the verdict was not supported by substantial and competent evidence,
Van's appeal does no more than seek to show that the jury got it wrong. In this effort, Van
alleges a multitude of instances (without citation to the record) in which defendant's counsel
made "erroneous arguments" and "the district court inappropriately believed him." CrossRespondent's Br. at 41.2 Despite these assertions, he has not shown that any ofthese supposed
errors affected Van's substantive rights or were prejudicial. For example, Van claims that PMC
"repeatedly interrupted" testimony with objections and the trial was unnecessarily prolonged by
PMC's "ill-founded arguments." Id. Notwithstanding the unsubstantiated inconvenience of

2 This entire argument, like the remainder of cross-respondent' s brief, is devoid of a
single citation to the record that would substantiate the claims being made.
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objections and the accompanying legal argument, Van has not shown that he had a substantive
right to uninterrupted testimony or a short(er) trial that was violated. Further, he has not shown
any facts that would show prejudice resulted from these alleged errors. Lastly, and most
significantly, Van fails to show how the verdict was not supported by substantial and competent
evidence.
Van's appeal of the trial court's award of attorney's fees to PMC for the appeal is
similarly without merit. PMC had sought attorney's fees under the correct statute,
Section 12-120(3)), in both its Answer to the Complaint in 2006 and its Answer to the Amended
Complaint in 2010. Supp. R. at 660-61; R. Vol. I at 98. When PMC prevailed on summary
judgment, Judge McDermott held in 2008 that actions on employment contracts were subject to
the fee provisions of Section 12-120(3)). R. Vol. I at 2. When PMC prevailed on all claims
following appeal and subsequent trial, it argued that it was entitled to attorney's fees under both
this Court's remand and Section 12-120(3)). R. Vol. II at 350-51, 356-58. In case there was any
ambiguity regarding the basis for the attorney's fees requests, it was further addressed in PMC's
response to Van's motion to disallow fees. See R. Vol. III at 548 ("PMC is also entitled to its
fees and costs on appeal under Section 12-120(3)) as PMC is now the prevailing party on all
claims.").
Moreover, it should be noted that the 2011 request for attorney's fees both on
appeal and for prevailing on summary judgment in the contract claims was made against the
backdrop of Judge McDermott's holding in 2008 that actions on employment contracts were
subject to the fee provisions of Section 12-120(3)), R. Vol. I at 2, and the Court's remand
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allowing the court to award attorney's fees related to the appeal. Thus, it was already wellestablished law of the case that Section 12-120(3)) applied to the contract claims and that fees
could be awarded to the prevailing party. See also Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho
259,263, 999 P.2d 914, 918 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding the prevailing party in a contract claim is
entitled to mandatory attorney's fees both at trial and on appeal).
II.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, PMC respectfully requests that the Court remand the
issue of attorney's fees and costs on summary judgment to the trial court for a determination of
an appropriate award. PMC also requests an award of attorney's fees and costs should it prevail
on appeal and on cross-appeal under the relevant statutes as discussed supra.
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

(~/

By,k

W\OLr.,~

Patricia M. Olsson - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant-RespondentCross Appellant
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